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Abstract
There seems to be a growing consensus that any interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics other than an instrumentalist interpretation will have to abandon the requirement
of Lorentz invariance, at least at the fundamental level, preserving at best Lorentz
invariance of phenomena. In particular, it is often said that the collapse postulate is
incompatible with the demands of relativity. It is the purpose of this paper to argue
that such a conclusion is premature, and that a covariant account of collapse can be
given according to which the state histories yielded by different reference frames are
the Lorentz transforms of each other.
1 Introduction
There seems to be a growing consensus that any interpretation of quantum mechanics other
than a instrumentalist one—that is, any interpretation that purports to provide a descrip-
tion of events and processes between measurements—will have to sacrifice the requirement of
Lorentz invariance at the fundamental level,1 preserving at best phenomenal Lorentz invari-
ance, or invariance regarding empirical predictions (see, e.g., Cushing 1994, Maudlin 1994,
1996). In particular, it has often been said that the collapse postulate is incompatible with
relativity and hence that interpretations that take state-vector reduction to be a real phys-
ical process must abandon relativity, perhaps by introducing a preferred notion of distant
simultaneity. It is the purpose of this paper to argue that such a conclusion is premature
at best, and that there is reason to believe that an account of quantum-mechanical state
reduction can be given that does not introduce a preferred foliation.
1The term “fundamental Lorentz invariance” was introduced by Dickson and Clifton (1998).
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It is not enough to formulate the theory in a manifestly covariant form. If there are
differences in the accounts given with respect to different reference frames, then one must
be able to argue, as Einstein did in formulating the special theory of relativity, that these
differences are nothing more than different descriptions of the same reality, using different
coordinates.
2 The Relativity of Entanglement
The notion of an instantaneous state of a spatially extended object, or an extended system
of objects, is a foliation-relative notion. The state of the system is its state along some
temporal slice, or, in other words, its state along some spacelike hyperplane or other spacelike
hypersurface of simultaneity. This is vividly illustrated by the well-known example of the
pole and the barn. With respect to a foliation of hyperplanes orthogonal to the barn’s
worldline, there is a temporal slice of the pole that lies entirely within the temporal slice of
the barn along the same hyperplane. With respect to a foliation of hyperplanes orthogonal
to the pole’s worldline, there is no temporal slice of the pole that lies entirely within the
temporal slice of the barn along the same hyperplane.
A comment is in order to forestall potential misunderstandings. Although, in special
relativity, one associates a particular foliation of spacetime into spacelike hyperplanes with
each state of inertial motion, which could be the state of motion of some observer, to say
that something is foliation-relative is not to say that it is relative to an observer or that
it is subjective in any way. No one is obliged to use his or her rest frame as a preferred
frame of reference; quite the contrary, it is the lesson of relativity that it is quite immaterial
which inertial reference frame one uses. Those who hold that an observer must always refer
motion to that observer’s rest frame, and hence must always regard him or herself as being
at rest, are invited to consider whether it makes sense, while driving in a car, to look at
the speedometer and say, “I’m moving at 50 miles per hour (with respect to the road)”
rather than “The road is moving at 50 miles per hour (with respect to me).” A choice of
reference frame is a choice of coordinate system; a choice of foliation is a choice of a global
time coordinate, nothing more.
Let us now consider the transformation of quantum states. Consider two spin- 1
2
particles,
at rest with respect to some reference frame K. We will assume that the particles are
localized in two regions, located at x1 and x2, respectively, that are small enough, compared
to the distances between them, that the regions may be regarded as points, but large enough
compared to the Compton wavelength of the systems that the systems can indeed be regarded
as localized within the regions. Let P be a point on S1’s worldline, and let Q and R be two
points on S2’s worldline, with R in the past of Q (see Figure 1). Let s be a spacelike
hypersurface that intersects S1’s worldline at P and S2’s worldline at R, and let s
′ be a
spacelike hypersurface that also intersects S1’s worldline at P , and intersects S2’s worldline
at Q.
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Figure 1.
Suppose, first, that the initial state of the combined system is
|ψ1(0)〉 = |z+〉1 ⊗ |z−〉2 , (1)
and suppose that a measurement of spin-x is performed on S2 at the spacetime point M ,
between R and Q. The result of such a measurement will be either +1 or −1, and, by
the projection postulate, the state of S2 after the measurement will be either |x+〉 or |x−〉.
Suppose that the outcome is +1. Then the state of the combined system along s is
|ψ1(ts)〉 = |z+〉1 ⊗ |z−〉2 (2)
whereas the state of the system along s′ is
|ψ′1(t′s′)〉 = |z′+〉1 ⊗ |x′+〉2 . (3)
There is nothing paradoxical in this state of affairs; the difference in the two states
is merely a consequence of a local change pertaining to S2, plus the familiar relativity of
simultaneity; the two hyperplanes link up two different moments in the evolution of S2 with
the same moment in the evolution of S1 to form their respective instantaneous temporal
slices of the combined system.
Now consider a scenario in which the initial state of the combined system is
|ψ2(0)〉 = |z−〉1 ⊗ |z+〉2 . (4)
Suppose, again, that spin-x is measured at M , and that again the result is +1. Then, along
s, the state of the system is
|ψ2(ts)〉 = |z−〉1 ⊗ |z+〉2 (5)
while the state of the combined system along s′ is
|ψ′2(t′s′)〉 = |z′−〉1 ⊗ |x′+〉2 . (6)
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Now let the initial state of the combined system be a linear superposition of the states
in the first two scenarios:
|ψ3(0)〉 = C1 |z+〉1 ⊗ |z−〉2 + C2 |z−〉1 ⊗ |z+〉2 (7)
We will suppose once again that a measurement of spin-x is performed at M , and that
the outcome is +1. Then, in this scenario, the state at any time, and along any hyperplane,
is simply a superposition of the states in the first two scenarios. Along s we have,
|ψ3(ts)〉 = C1 |z+〉1 ⊗ |z−〉2 + C2 |z−〉1 ⊗ |z+〉2 (8)
Along s′, the state is:2
|ψ′3(t′s′)〉 = C1 |z′+〉1 ⊗ (2〈x′ + |z′−〉2) |x′+〉2 + C2 |z′−〉1 ⊗ (2〈x′ + |z′−〉2) |x′+〉
=
1√
2
(C1 |z′+〉1 + C2 |z′−〉1)⊗ |x′+〉2 . (9)
Here we have a superposition of two states that undergo local changes in the transition
from s to s′, pertaining only to S2. This change in the state vector ought also to count
as a local change pertaining to S2. Here again the two hyperplanes merely link up two
different moments in the evolution of S2 with the same moment in the evolution of S1 to
form instantaneous temporal slices of the combined system; the only difference is that we
have here to do with a superposition of such spliced states.
There is, of course, an important difference between the third scenario and the first
two. In the first two scenarios, the state of the system is a factorizable state along both
hyperplanes. In the third, the state of the combined system is an entangled state along s
and a factorizable state along s′. This seems odd, as we think of the factorizable state (9)
as attributing a definite spin state to S1, whereas in the entangled state (8), S1 has no spin
state of its own at all. An analogy might help: it is as if a marriage could be dissolved
unilaterally by the declaration of one spouse. If a husband and wife are some distance apart
at the moment that the wife declares the marriage dissolved, then the question of whether, at
a given point on his worldline that is spacelike separated from the declaration, the husband
is married or divorced, requires a choice of hypersurface of simultaneity.
This circumstance, that, at a spacetime point P a system may be part of an entangled
state along one hypersurface passing through P , and part of a factorizable state along an-
other hypersurface passing through P , may be called the relativity of entanglement. It is
a consequence jointly of the relativity of simultaneity and of modelling collapse as a local
change in the state vector.
3 Transformations between foliations
The instantaneous state of an extended system, classical or quantum, is defined along a
spacelike hypersurface. Within a foliation, the transition from one hypersurface to another
2In discussing collapse, it will be more convenient not to require the state vector to be normalized at all
times.
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is given by the dynamical evolution of the system. How are states defined hypersurfaces
belonging to different foliations related to each other?
Consider two systems,3 S1 and S2, which at time t are located, with respect to some
reference frame Σ, at positions x1(t) and x2(t), respectively. Let Σ
′ be a reference frame
moving with velocity v in the positive x-direction relative to Σ, and let the transformation
from Σ to Σ′ be given by the Lorentz boost,
x′ = γ (x− v t)
y′ = y z′ = z
t′ = γ
(
t− vx/c2
)
, (10)
where γ = 1/
√
1− v2/c2. Let H1 and H2 be the Hilbert spaces associated with S1 and S2,
respectively, and let the states of the two systems at time t be given, with respect to Σ, by
|u(t)〉1 and |v(t)〉2.
By Wigner’s theorem (see Weinberg 1995, 91–96), there is a unitary transformation
operator Λ1 that takes vectors in H1 into their transforms under the Lorentz boost (10).
Similarly, there is a unitary Lorentz boost operator Λ2 on H2. As Dickson and Clifton (1998,
15) have shown, the transformation operator on H1 ⊗H2 is simply Λ1 ⊗ Λ2. Therefore, for
any time t, the Lorentz transform of |ψ(t)〉12 is
|ψ′〉12 = Λ1 |u(t)〉1 ⊗ Λ2 |v(t)〉2
= |u′(t′1(t))〉1 ⊗ |v′(t′2(t))〉2 , (11)
where
t′i(t) = γ
(
t− v xi(t)/c2
)
. (12)
These are not instantaneous temporal slices of the combined system with respect to the
Σ′’s hyperplanes of simultaneity. Rather, the transform of a state |u(t)〉1⊗ |v(t)〉2 at a given
Σ-time t is a description of the states of the two component systems at two different times,
as measured by Σ′’s time coordinate. In order to get instantaneous states with respect to Σ′
from instantaneous states with respect to Σ, we need to know something of the dynamical
evolution of the combined system.
Assume that the Hamiltonian of the combined system is simply the sum of the component
Hamiltonians, with no interaction term,
H12 = H1 ⊗ I2 + I1 ⊗H2. (13)
Then the unitary evolution operator U(t; t0) = e
H(t−t0)/ih¯ factors:
U(t; t0) = U1(t; t0)⊗ U2(t; t0). (14)
3The generalization to any finite number of systems is straightforward, and to continuous fields by a
limiting process. See Tomonaga (1946).
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Once we have a factorizable evolution operator, we can obtain states along the hyper-
planes of constant t′ from state defined on hyperplanes of constant t.
|u′(t′)〉1 ⊗ |v′(t′)〉2 = Λ1 U1(t1(t′); t) |u(t)〉 ⊗ Λ2 U2(t2(t′); t) |v(t)〉 , (15)
where
ti(t
′) = γ
(
t′ + v x′i(t
′)/c2
)
. (16)
Because of the linearity of the Lorentz boost operators and of the evolution operators, the
transformation (15) applies to any state of the combined system, and not only to factorizable
states:
|ψ′(t′)〉 = Λ1 U1(t1(t′); t)⊗ Λ2 U2(t2(t′); t) |ψ(t)〉 . (17)
Thus, the state history of the combined system with respect to Σ′ can be obtained from
a state history given with respect to Σ, together with knowledge of the dynamics of the
system.
Let us now add collapse to the picture,4 and assume the existence of generalized evolution
operators E1(t; t0), E2(t; t0) that approximate unitary evolution most of the time but produce
a collapse whenever conditions are ripe (whatever that may turn out to be; such events ought
not be confined to the laboratory). We can assume these operators to be linear if we don’t
require that they preserve the norm of the state vector. After a measurement of, say, spin-x
on S1, the operator E1(t; t0) becomes either P
|x+〉
1 or P |x−〉1 , with the probability for each
transition given by the usual quantum-mechanical rules for computing probabilities (note
that these involve the entire global state vector; the probabilities are non-local quantities).
Collapse evolution will not be assumed to be a reversible process, and so in general Ei(t; t0)
will be undefined for t < t0. Because of this, we will not always be able to obtain a state of
the system along any given hyperplane of constant t′ from any state of constant t; in order
to obtain a Σ′-state at time t′, we must start with a Σ-state at a time t such that t ≤ t1(t′)
and t ≤ t2(t′). With this proviso, we have:
|ψ′(t′)〉 = Λ1 E1(t1(t′); t)⊗ Λ2 E2(t2(t′); t) |ψ(t)〉 . (18)
for t ≤ Min[t1(t′), t2(t′)]. It thus remains true that a complete state history given with
respect to Σ uniquely determines the state history given with respect to Σ′.
4 The EPR-Bohm experiment
Let us now apply this picture of the collapse of foliation-relative states to the familiar EPR-
Bohm experiment.
4Though the notion of foliation-relative state evolution was present from the early days work on relativistic
quantum theories (see Dirac 1933, Tomonaga 1946, Schwinger 1951), the application of this notion to state-
vector collapse was perhaps first made by Aharonov and Albert (1984). Fleming (1986, 1989, 1996) has
perhaps been the most prominent exponent of foliation-relative collapse.
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Let S1 and S2 be spin-
1
2
particles, initially in the singlet spin state,
|ψ(0)〉 = |z+〉1 ⊗ |z−〉2 − |z−〉1 ⊗ |z+〉2
= |x+〉1 ⊗ |x−〉2 − |x−〉1 ⊗ |x+〉2 . (19)
Suppose that measurements of spin-x and spin-z are performed on S1 and S2, respectively,
at spacelike separation, and suppose that the outcomes of the two experiments are both
+1. Let Σ be a reference frame with respect to which the measurement on S1 is performed
first, and let Σ′ be a reference frame with respect to which the order of the measurements
is reversed. Let ta be a time, with respect to Σ, prior to the measurement on S1, let tb be
after the measurement on S1 but before the measurement on S2, and let tc be a time after
both measurements are completed (see Figure 2).
M1 M2
S
ta
tb
tc
t’A
t’B
t’C
Figure 2. Spacetime diagram of the EPR-Bohm experiment.
Define the ‘collapse evolution operators,’
E1(t) =
{
I1, before the measurement on S1.
P |x+〉1 , after the measurement on S1.
(20)
E2(t) =
{
I2, before the measurement on S2.
P |z+〉2 , after the measurement on S2.
The state history of the two-particle system, with respect to Σ, is given by
|ψ(t)〉 = E1(t)⊗ E2(t) |ψ〉singlet . (21)
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Along the hyperplane t = ta, the state is
|ψ(ta)〉 = E1(ta)⊗ E2(ta) |ψ〉singlet
= I1 ⊗ I2 |ψ〉singlet = |ψ〉singlet . (22)
Along the hyperplane t = tb, we have,
|ψ(tb)〉 = E1(tb)⊗ E2(tb) |ψ〉singlet
= P |x+〉1 ⊗ I2 |ψ〉singlet
= P |x+〉1 |x+〉1 ⊗ |x−〉2 − P |x−〉1 |x+〉1 ⊗ |x+〉2
= |x+〉1 ⊗ |x−〉2 . (23)
Along the hyperplane t = tc, the state is,
|ψ(tc)〉 = E1(tc)⊗ E2(tc) |ψ〉singlet
= P |x+〉1 ⊗ P |z+〉2 |ψ〉singlet
= P |x+〉1 |x+〉1 ⊗ P |z+〉2 |x−〉2
= − 1√
2
|x+〉1 ⊗ |z+〉2 . (24)
To describe the evolution of the state as given by Σ′, we define,
E ′1(t
′) =
{
I1, before the measurement on S1.
P |x
′+〉
1 , after the measurement on S1.
(25)
E ′2(t
′) =
{
I2, before the measurement on S2.
P |z
′+〉
2 , after the measurement on S2.
These operators are simply the Lorentz transforms of the operators (20).
Along the hyperplane t′ = t′A, the state is
|ψ′(t′A)〉 = E ′1(t′A)⊗ E ′2(t′A) |ψ′〉singlet
= I1 ⊗ I2 |ψ′〉singlet = |ψ′〉singlet . (26)
Along the hyperplane t′ = t′B, we have,
|ψ′(t′B)〉 = E ′1(t′B)⊗ E ′2(t′B) |ψ〉singlet
= I1 ⊗ P |z′+〉2 |ψ′〉singlet
= |z′+〉1 ⊗ P |z
′+〉
2 |z′−〉2 − |z′−〉1 ⊗ P |z
′+〉
2 |z′+〉2
= − |z′−〉1 ⊗ |z′+〉2 .
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Along the hyperplane t′ = t′C , the state is
|ψ′(t′C)〉 = E ′1(t′C)⊗ E ′2(t′C) |ψ′〉singlet
= P |x
′+〉
1 ⊗ P |z′+〉2 |ψ′〉singlet
= −P |x′+〉1 |z′+〉1 ⊗ P |z
′+〉
2 |z′+〉2
= − 1√
2
|x′+〉1 ⊗ |z′+〉2 . (27)
The difference in the two state histories can clearly be seen to arise solely from the
difference in foliations used to define the instantaneous states of the evolving system, and
therefore, the two state histories are, in a straightforward way, the Lorentz transformations
of each other. This in spite of the fact that, along tb, the state of the system is |x+〉1⊗|x−〉2,
even though S2 is never in the state |x−〉2 on the state history according to Σ′, and, along
t′B, the state of the system is − |z−〉1 ⊗ |z+〉2, even though, on the state history according
to Σ, S1 is never in the state |z′−〉.5
Since there is a collapse between the hyperplane t = tb and the hyperplane t
′ = t′B in
both directions, we cannot apply (18) directly to one of these states to obtain the other.
This doesn’t mean that the two states are unrelated, however, as they both can be obtained
from the state along t = ta:
6
|ψ(tb)〉 = E1(tb)⊗ E2(tb) |ψ(ta)〉 (28)
|ψ(t′B)〉 = Λ1 ⊗ Λ2E2(tc) |ψ(ta)〉 (29)
For convenience, the hyperplanes t = ta and t
′ = t′B have been taken to intersect S1’s
worldline at the same point, and the hyperplanes t = tc and t
′ = t′B have been taken to
intersect S2’s worldline at the same point.
5 Probabilities, causality, and passion-at-a-distance
The quantum-mechanical rule for assigning probabilities to outcomes of measurements is
easily formulated in terms of foliation-relative states. Let F be any foliation, and let σ
be the member of F passing through the measurement event (or, perhaps, immediately to
the past of the measurement event). Then the expectation value of a measurement of an
observable A is given by
〈A〉σ =
〈ψ(σ)|A |ψ(σ)〉
〈ψ(σ)|ψ(σ)〉 . (30)
Probabilities, therefore, are foliation-relative. In spite of this, the rule (30) does not pick
out a preferred foliation, as long as the Hamiltonian contains no nonlocal interaction terms.
5It should be pointed out that, whenever the states along two hypersurfaces passing through a point P
on S1’s worldline both assign a definite spin state to S1, they will agree on what spin state it is.
6This answers an objection raised by Maudlin (1996, 302) to foliation-relative collapse.
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Although a statistical test of quantum mechanics requires calculation of probabilities with
respect to some foliation-relative state evolution, it doesn’t matter which foliation is chosen.7
The foliation-relativity of probabilities has the odd consequence that a collapse event,
even though it is a local event, will sometimes be assigned different probabilities by states
along different hyperplanes passing through a single point. There is no limit on how different
these probabilities can be. Suppose, for example, that the initial state of our two-particle
system is, instead of the singlet state, the state,
² |z+〉1 ⊗ |z−〉2 +
√
1− |²|2 |z−〉1 ⊗ |z+〉2 (31)
with |²| << 1. Suppose that measurements of spin-z are performed on both particles at
spacelike separation, and that the outcome of the measurement on S2 is −1. Then, a
hypersurface passing through the measurement on S1 and crossing S2’s worldline to the
past of the measurement on S2 will assign a very small probability |²|2 to the outcome +1
of the measurement on S1, whereas a hypersurface passing through the measurement on S1
and crossing S2’s worldline to the future of the measurement on S2 will assign a probability
1 to the same outcome.
The fact that probability assignments do not factor into independent local probabilities
(and, by Bell’s theorem, cannot be regarded as supervening on independent local proba-
bilities), is seen by some as a form of superluminal causal influence (e.g. Maudlin 1994).
There is, however, a marked difference between the Bell-inequality violating dependence be-
tween systems in entangled states and an interaction of the sort that would be modelled
by an interaction term in the Hamiltonian of the combined system. For spatially sepa-
rated systems, such a term could not result in Lorentz-invariant state evolution, or even
Lorentz-invariant statistics, but would on the contrary require a preferred notion of dis-
tant simultaneity. Indeed, any such interaction term will permit superluminal signalling via
suitable measurements on suitable states.
It is not a matter of great moment whether we call the quantum-mechanical failure of
probabilistic independence of spacelike separated events a form of causal influence, or invent
a new term for it, such as “passion-at-a-distance” (Shimony 1984). Brian Skyrms (1984) is
correct when he says that our notion of causality is an “amiably confused jumble” which
unravels when applied to the quantum domain. What does matter is that we not ignore
the fact that there is a difference between the way in which quantum mechanics treats this
sort of influence and its treatment of causal interactions modelled by interaction terms in the
Hamiltonian; if our physical theories are a guide for forming causal notions and applying them
to the world, this suggests that at the very least we are dealing with something other than
familiar causal interactions. Moreover, there seems to a physical basis for this distinction,
as exhibited by the fact that interactions given by interaction terms in the Hamiltonian
can be manipulated for signalling, whereas the lack of probabilistic independence that arises
7This suggests that there ought to be a way to formulate the rule in a manifestly covariant way, without
mention of any non-intrinsic structures; so far, however, this has not been done. Unless and until such a
formulation is available, we must refer probability assignments to foliation-relative states.
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from quantum entanglement cannot, in the absence of nonlocal interaction terms in the
Hamiltonian, be used to send superluminal signals.8
The distinction is important because, relativity theory does not, by itself, prohibit su-
perluminal causation. If the special theory of relativity gives us reason to disbelieve in su-
perluminal causation, the reason lies in our belief that the causal relation requires a unique
temporal ordering of cause and effect. What is ruled out by relativity is any relation between
spacelike separated events that requires a unique temporal ordering. The relation of signal
transmission to reception is such a relation. It appears that the relation that holds between
quantum systems in an entangled state is not such a relation. If this is so, then there is
reason to hope for peaceful coexistence between quantum mechanics and special relativity
after all.
6 Objections
The picture presented here is of stochastic evolution of foliation-relative states, with no
foliation preferred. A number of objections have appeared in the literature to such a notion.
There is not space here to address these objections in full, but it is possible to give the
outlines of a response to the chief objections.
One objection is that foliation-relative state evolution, and the associated notion of
foliation-relative becoming, makes such evolution a subjective matter and results in a break-
down of intersubjectivity (Dorato 1995, 593). A preliminary answer to this objection is to
point out that the objection presupposes that a foliation is the extended present of some
actual or possible observer; the special theory of relativity does not commit us to this. A
choice of foliation is a matter of choice of coordinates, rather than a matter of the state of
motion of the observer. A fuller answer to this question would have to address the larger
issue of which it is a part, which is the issue of whether the foliation-relative notion of becom-
ing that goes along with foliation-relative state evolution suffices for a realist, probabilistic
interpretation of quantum mechanics (see also Maxwell 1985, Saunders 1996). I believe that
it does, but I cannot do justice to the issue within the scope of this paper.
A second objection, due to Maudlin, stems from a supposed ontological independence
of state histories defined along different foliations. Maudlin, reacting primarily to Fleming
(1989), wrote,
The wave function on a hyperplane is, as it were, ontologically atomic. Wave
functions defined on hyperplanes in the same family can be related by a dynamics
which uses the family as a substitute for absolute time, but relations among wave
functions from different families are obscure at best (1996, 302).
8This point has, of course, been made many times before, and is often couched in terms of Jon Jarrett’s
factorization of the Bell locality condition into a conjunction of the condition that Jarrett (1984) calls
“Locality” and Shimony (1986) calls “Parameter Independence,” on the one hand, and the condition that
Jarrett calls “Completeness” and Shimony calls “Outcome Independence,” on the other.
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If this were correct, then a dilemma would ensue. Either the state histories along each
foliation would agree as to the macroscopic outcomes of experiments, or they wouldn’t. If all
foliations agreed on the outcome of experiments, this would be a coincidence inexplicable on
the basis of the dynamics of the theory, which only connect states within a foliation (Maudlin
1996, 301). If, on the other hand, the state histories did not agree on such outcomes, “[t]he
wave functions on each family of hyperplanes would then completely decouple, yielding an
independent world for each foliation”(302).
The alleged ontological independence of state histories along differing foliations does not
exist, however.9 Different foliations are merely different ways of dividing spacetime into
3-dimensional spaces of simultaneity, and accounts given with respect to different foliations
are merely different accounts of the same processes and events. Although one cannot always
transform directly from the state on one hypersurface to a state on another, a state history
given with respect to one foliation determines the state history with respect to any other
foliation. The relations among state vectors from different families are given by our equation
(18) and its generalizations.
A third objection, also due to Maudlin, is that the relativity of entanglement “shocks
intuitions which are formed by acquaintance both with Relativity and with non-relativistic
quantum mechanics” (1994, 209). Although, when a system is entangled with another, this
is clearly a relation between the two systems (and hence it would not, perhaps, be surprising
if the nature of this entanglement were a foliation-relative affair), when a system is not
entangled with another, it seems plausible to assume that this is a matter purely of the
intrinsic state of it and hence ought to be an invariant fact about the system. Acceptance of
collapse as part of foliation-relative state evolution requires regarding this intuition, formed,
as Maudlin points out, by exposure to relativity and non-relativistic quantum mechanics,
as mistaken. To go back to our anthropocentric analogy: if marriage is a relation, so too
is divorce! It would interesting to explore whether the manner in which the relativity of
simultaneity shocks our intuitions shares any important similarities with the counterintuitive
features of relativistic quantum theory without collapse.
9That is, it does not exist on the interpretation advocated here. It is not my intention to examine whether
Maudlin has correctly interpreted Fleming. The issue at hand is whether the objection succeeds against the
interpretation advocated in this paper.
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